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NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

_________
No.05-4060
_________

MOHAMMAD S. GHAZIASKAR,
Petitioner
v.
ATTORNEY GENERAL FOR THE UNITED STATES,
Respondent
___________________
On Petition For Review of Final Order
Of the Board of Immigration Appeals
Agency No. A22-222-833
___________________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
April 16, 2009

Before: McKEE, SMITH and VAN ANTWERPEN, Circuit Judges

(Filed: September 3, 2009)

OPINION OF THE COURT
McKEE, Circuit Judge
Mohammad Ghaziaskar petitions for review of a final order of removal entered by
the Board of Immigration Appeals based on the Immigration Judge’s determination that a
prior criminal conviction made Ghaziaskar statutorily ineligible for withholding of
removal to Iran. Ghaziaskar also challenges the BIA’s denial of his motion to defer
removal under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). For the reasons that follow, we
will dismiss the petition as to his challenge to the BIA’s denial of eligibility for
withholding based on his criminal conviction, but grant the petition and remand to the
BIA for further proceedings pertinent to his CAT claim.
I.
Because we write primarily for the parties, it is not necessary to recite the facts or
history of this case except as may be helpful to our brief discussion. Ghaziaskar first
challenges the BIA’s final order of removal affirming the IJ’s ruling that he is ineligible
for withholding of removal because of his criminal conviction for drug trafficking.
Ghaziaskar was convicted of the use of a telephone to facilitate distribution of opium, in
violation of 21 U.S.C. § 843(b).1 Ghaziaskar argues that his conviction was not a
“particularly serious crime” and therefore did not disqualify him for withholding of
removal. Ghaziaskar also argues that the BIA erred by concluding that he is not likely to
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This is an aggravated felony involving fraud or deceit where the loss to the victim exceeded $10,000.

2

be tortured if returned to Iran based upon his past political opposition to the Iranian
revolutionary government, his drug-related criminal convictions, and his conversion to
Christianity.
II.
Ghaziaskar argues that he should not be disqualified for a grant of withholding of
removal to Iran because of his drug-related conviction. The Immigration Judge disagreed
and concluded that Ghaziaskar was not eligible for asylum because he had been convicted
of use of a telephone to facilitate distribution of opium in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 843(b).
To be eligible for a grant of withholding of removal, an alien must show that his
“life or freedom would be threatened in that country because of [his] race, religion,
nationality, membership in a particular social group or political opinion.” 8 U.S.C. §
1231(b)(3)(A). Aliens are disqualified from receiving such withholding of removal,
however, if they have been convicted of a “particularly serious crime.” 8 U.S.C. §
1231(b)(3)(ii). An alien who was convicted of an “aggravated felony (or felonies) for
which the alien has been sentenced to an aggregate term of imprisonment of at least 5
years shall be considered to have committed a particularly serious crime.” 8 U.S.C. §
1231(b)(3). Where an alien is convicted of a crime with a lesser sentence, the Attorney
General is not precluded from determining that the crime is nonetheless a particularly
serious crime. Id.
Ghaziaskar was convicted of using a telephone to facilitate the distribution of
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opium, a crime with a maximum sentence of four years. 21 U.S.C. § 846 (1983). He was
also convicted of an aggravated felony involving fraud or deceit, but its maximum
sentence did not reach the five year threshold in 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(iv). We must
therefore determine if the BIA erred in affirming the IJ’s ruling that Ghaziaskar’s
conviction is particularly serious. In resolving that issue, we remain mindful that any
drug trafficking crime is presumed to be a particularly serious offense. Matter of Y-L, 23
I. & N. Dec. 270, 276-77 (BIA 2002). While we presume that a drug trafficking crime is
a “particularly serious crime,” an alien may overcome this presumption by satisfying the
six criteria set forth in Matter of Y-L. 23 I. & N. Dec. at 276-77. These criteria are :
(1) a very small quantity of controlled substance; (2) a very modest amount of
money paid for the drugs in the offending transaction; (3) merely peripheral
involvement by the alien in the criminal activity, transaction, or conspiracy; (4) the
absence of any violence or threat of violence, implicit or otherwise, associated
with the offense; (5) the absence of any organized crime or terrorist involvement,
direct or indirect, in relation to the offending activity; and (6) the absence of any
adverse or harmful effect of the activity or transaction on juveniles.
Id.
Here, the government represents without contradiction that Ghaziaskar’s offense
involved use of a telephone as part of his participation in a drug transaction involving a
$60,000 purchase of illegal narcotics. Respondent Br. at 26. That in no way undermines
the presumption he must overcome. Ghaziaskar’s task of overcoming that presumption is
also not advanced by his failure to address five out of the six Y-L criteria. Rather, he
merely argues that his involvement was peripheral. Even assuming arguendo that it was,
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peripheral involvement in what certainly appears to be a particularly serious crime does
not address any of the remaining Y-L factors.
Ghaziaskar argues that the IJ improperly looked beyond the specific crime he plead
guilty to and focused instead on the more serious crimes he was indicted for. Petitioner
Br. at 22. It is clear that the IJ relied partially on charges in the indictment in concluding
that Ghaziaskar’s involvement in the drug transaction was “more than peripheral; he was
an active participant in the scheme.” App. at 241. However, given Ghaziaskar’s failure to
address the Y-L factors, we need not decide whether the IJ’s reliance on facts beyond
Ghaziaskar’s plea agreement warrants relief. On this record, we conclude that the BIA
did not err in affirming the IJ’s decision that Ghaziaskar is disqualified from receiving the
benefit of withholding of removal.
III.
Ghaziaskar’s challenge to the BIA’s denial of his motion to defer removal under
CAT, is more troublesome. He argues that he established that it is more likely than not
that he would be tortured by the Iranian government (or its agents) if he is removed to his
home country. CAT prohibits the removal of an alien who establishes that “it is more
likely than not” that he will be tortured by or at the instigation of the government if
removed to his home country. 8 C.F.R. § 208.18(a)(1); Francois v. Gonzales, 448 F.3d
645, 649 (3d Cir. 2006). Torture is defined as “an extreme form of cruel and inhuman
treatment and does not include lesser forms of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or
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punishment.” 8 C.F.R. § 208.18(a)(2). CAT requires decision-makers to consider all
relevant evidence, including
(I) evidence of past torture inflicted upon the applicant; (ii) evidence that the
applicant could relocate to a part of the country of removal where he or she is not
likely to be tortured; (iii) evidence of gross, flagrant or mass violations of human
rights within the country of removal, where applicable; and (iv) other relevant
information regarding conditions in the country of removal.
8 C.F.R. § 208.18(c)(3).
An IJ’s adverse credibility determination is “reviewed for substantial evidence.”
Berishaj v. Ashcroft, 378 F.3d 314, 322-23 (3d. Cir. 2004). We uphold an adverse
credibility determination unless “any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to
conclude to the contrary.” Gao v. Ashcroft, 299 F.3d 266, 272 (3d Cir. 2002). An “alien’s
credibility, by itself may satisfy his burden, or doom his claim.” Dia v. Ashcroft, 353 F.3d
228, 247 (3d Cir. 2003).
Here, the IJ concluded that there were “enormous gaps in the respondent’s
credibility.” App. at 28a. The IJ did not believe that Ghaziaskar’s participation in the
radio program, the “Persian Hour,” was anti-Khomeini and anti-government because the
broadcast occurred after the revolution. Additionally, the IJ discredited Ghaziaskar’s
explanation of why he has two passports. App. at 29a.. However, focusing on any
discrepancy regarding the passport ignores the seriousness of his claim and the potential
for harm that may await him in Iran if Ghaziaskar’s involvement with the radio program
is viewed with disfavor by the Iranian regime. To his credit, the IJ conceded that
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Ghaziaskar’s involvement with the Persian Hour “may in fact have been what he said it
was.” App. at 31a. However, the IJ also dismissed the seriousness of Ghaziaskar’s
involvement with the radio program because it occurred before the overthrow of the
Shah’s regime.
Ghaziaskar argues that his conversion to Christianity could also subject him to
torture. He testified that he attended Catholic services and took communion along with
his wife and children. The IJ disputed his “sudden conversion to Christianity,” because
the IJ believed that Ghaziaskar would not have been able to take communion without
being a member of the church. App. at 31a. However, that conclusion is clearly based
upon the IJ’s understanding of practices of Christian churches he is familiar with. There is
nothing in the record to suggest that Christian churches in Iran adhere to the strict
protocols that exist in some churches in the United States. The IJ was also concerned that
Ghaziaskar could not provide the name of pastors or churches that he attended. Id.
However, we believe that the IJ’s apparent belief that Ghaziaskar would not have been
able to take communion in a Catholic church was erroneous. Although a non-Catholic is
not supposed to take communion in the Catholic Church, Ghaziaskar certainly could have
received communion in any number of Catholic churches, even though he is not Catholic,
not because it is acceptable but, because the priest did not know he was not Catholic.
Ghaziaskar argues that the IJ and the BIA both “failed to consider the country
conditions in Iran.” Pet. Br. at 29. Specifically, Ghaziaskar points to “overwhelming

7

evidence regarding the prevalence of torture in Iran contained in the 2002 Country
Reports” that the BIA did not adequately consider. Id. The 2002 Country Reports point
to (1) “systematic abuses” of human rights in Iran including summary executions and the
widespread use of torture, J.A. 304a-05a; (2) Iranians returning from abroad are subject to
searches and extensive questioning for evidence of anti-government activities abroad,
J.A. 319a; (3) Iran’s judiciary is “subject to government and religious influence resulting
in lack of due process and fair trials, J.A. 309-a-10a; and (4) there are “numerous credible
reports that security forces and prison personnel continue to torture detainees and
prisoners, J.A. 307a.
This record does not establish that the IJ or BIA adequately considered conditions
in Iran before reaching its conclusion that Ghaziaskar failed to establish that it was more
likely than not that he would be tortured upon his return to Iran. We also think it
appropriate to take judicial notice of the fact that current tensions in Iran would only
exacerbate what this record establishes as an already shameful record of respecting
human rights. We think that this case can best be resolved by allowing the BIA an
opportunity to more closely consider relevant Country Reports in assessing Ghaziaskar’s
claim. We also think that the BIA should give consideration to the possibility that it
would be more likely than not that his involvement in the radio program, his return from
the United States, and his claimed conversion to Christianity could well subject him to the
kind of intentional mistreatment that the CAT was intended to protect against.
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We therefore remand for the BIA’s reconsideration of Ghaziaskar’s petition for
relief under the CAT.
IV.
For the aforementioned reasons, we will dismiss Ghaziaskar’s petition in part, and
remand it in part for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
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